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Abstract
Is there a particular danger in following Deleuze’s philosophy to its end
result? According to Peter Hallward, Deleuze’s philosophy has some
rather severe conclusions. Deleuze has been portrayed by him as a
theological and spiritual thinker of life. Hallward seeks to challenge
the accepted view of Deleuze, showing that these accepted norms in
Deleuzian scholarship should be challenged and that, initially, Deleuze
calls for the evacuation of political action in order to remain firm in
the realm of pure contemplation. This article intends to investigate and
defend Deleuze’s philosophy against the critical and theological accounts
portrayed by Hallward, arguing that Deleuze’s philosophy is not only
creative and vital but also highly revolutionary and ‘a part’ of the
given world. It then goes on to examine Hallward’s distortion of the
actual/virtual distinction in Deleuze because Hallward is not able to
come to grips with the concept of life in Deleuze’s philosophy. We live
in an intensive and dynamic world and the main points of Deleuze’s
philosophy concern the transformation of the world. Deleuze is not
seeking to escape the world, but rather to deal with inventive and
creative methods to transform society.
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I. Introduction: The Context of the Turn and the Debate
In the last ten years, many texts have been released about the philosophy
of Gilles Deleuze. Most of these texts explicate Deleuze’s work in
multicultural and interdisciplinary frameworks. The recent trend has
been to elaborate how these concrete concepts interact in the world.
This has been a successful endeavour in various fields belonging to
the Humanities. The academic enterprise, in theory, has given Deleuze
studies a more prominent role in the world of cultural and critical
theory. It is now possible to attach Deleuze’s work to theories of
cinema, philosophy, postcolonialism, artwork, literature and gender
studies. However, there has also been a backlash against Deleuze’s work.
For example, Alain Badiou released Deleuze: The Clamor of Being in
1997, which criticised Deleuze’s philosophy for being too tied to the
abstract. According to Badiou, Deleuze’s philosophy is centred on the
ascetic thinker. Badiou makes three essential claims about Deleuze’s
philosophy: (1) it is organised around a metaphysics of the one; (2) it
contains the dispossession of the subject; and (3) it requires a creative
ascetic exercise (Badiou 2004: 16). These claims have been virtually
ignored by the academic community, even though Badiou was starting to
make a name in French thought. It was not until Peter Hallward’s text,
Out of This World, in 2006 that things finally got stirred up. Badiou’s
text only surveys Deleuze’s solitary work; it excludes his co-authored
works with Félix Guattari whereas Hallward’s critique contains all of
Deleuze’s œuvre.
Badiou’s initial critique of Deleuze lies more on the grounds of
interpreting Deleuzian metaphysics in regards to the event. Hallward’s
maintains a radical thesis, that initially Deleuze holds onto a medieval
and theological project, which cuts off all relations with the world
and asks its material subjects to get rid of their human essence.
Overall, Hallward holds on to the notion that Deleuze’s philosophy is
dangerous and that it distracts all actual creatures from their world: it
culminates in a philosophy of indifference. Hallward states, ‘Those of
us who seek to change the world and to empower its inhabitants will
need to look elsewhere’ (Hallward 2006: 186). Although the academic
community did not respond well to Hallward’s critique, there were few
critical responses to Hallward’s text. Initially, only a handful of critics
responded. However, the debate does not start here. The fundamental
attack on Deleuze was that Deleuzian politics was meaningless, singular
and has no effect on the world. The recent trend in Deleuze studies is
to compare Deleuze’s philosophy to theology. Therefore, the debate that
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starts with Hallward is perpetuated by most people working in favour of
Deleuze, who limit their studies of his work to its theological dimension.
Deleuzians have not adequately answered Hallward’s challenge.
Instead, they have ignored his claims and proceeded to use theological
apparatuses to explain his concepts. Works such as F. LeRon Shults’s
Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism
(2014), Joshua Alan Ramey’s The Hermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and
Spiritual Ordeal (2012) and Christopher Ben Simpson’s Deleuze and
Theology (2012) are now the most used secondary literature on the
French philosopher. This gesture not only accepts Hallward’s thesis
indirectly, it cuts off creativity in a field open to interdisciplinarity.
The new literature has been fragmented; it is no longer diverse, but is
restricted to solving one function, the theological. While there are still
some works being written on Deleuzian politics, it has been virtually
abandoned. My present mission is to explain Hallward’s position and
subsequently defend Deleuze’s philosophy from Hallward’s critique.
One must make a side note that Hallward indirectly ‘creates’ a new
language to describe Deleuze’s philosophy that will be used quite
frequently in order to accurately present his position. In addition to
defending Deleuze, the target of this article is Hallward’s logic, which
inaccurately interprets the relationship between the virtual and the
actual. Hallward misappropriates the real context of what creation is
to Deleuze.
II. Hallward’s Deleuze: Theophany and the
Logic of Redemption
Peter Hallward states that Deleuze writes a redemptive philosophy in
conjunction with his spiritual allies: Spinoza, Saint Paul and Suhrawardi
(Hallward 1997b: 6). This redemptive logic is designed to ‘save’ its
readers from a situation depraved by consciousness, representation
and ‘the other’ (6). Redemption from the aforementioned provides an
immediate access to a different kind of situation, one that is grounded
on an inclusive immanence to itself. Hallward notes that Deleuze’s œuvre
explicates our passage from such a contaminated situation (material life)
to a purer and more primordial situation. Deleuze’s corpus, according
to Hallward, begins with an ontological principle, or ‘God’ (6). This
all-powerful force is somehow repressed by its own power of creation.
The logic of redemption that Hallward puts forward is one aligned with
both medieval and Islamic theology. Spinoza, Saint Paul and Suhrawardi
attack our human, specific and worldly forms of difference, in favour of
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another-worldly force (7). If redemption means an act of redeeming or
atoning for our mistakes and our sins, Deleuze’s philosophy attempts
to ‘rescue’ us from the material world (7). According to Hallward,
Deleuze’s radical philosophy of immanence must entail a rigorous
attack of transcendence and refuse all forms of negation. However,
Hallward points out that this very critique of transcendence, posited
by Deleuze, obtains its movement through a form of transcendence.
This transcendence is the move away from our apparent contaminated
situation, which could be called ‘the given’, and contains our human
significance. According to Hallward, Deleuze’s ‘God’ asks us to leave
behind our material reality for a singular, inhuman and impersonal,
position (6). This transcendence is the propelling gesture of Deleuze’s
entire project; and one that Hallward feels is quite problematic (8).
For Deleuze, Spinoza and Suhrawardi, being is defined by a singularity
or univocity.
For Deleuze, being is univocal and the one expresses everything of the
multiple (humans, dogs, plants, stars). What this amounts to is that ‘the
real’ creates everything it perceives and conceives. There is only one kind
of production for Deleuze: the production of the real (8). Humanity is
produced and must, in some way, determine the differences between the
real and unreal. However, as we have seen, the real is a part of this self-
expressive and immediate reality. The real must be immediate and not a
part of the material world.
For Deleuze, as Hallward notes, Spinoza, Saint Paul and Suhrawardi
conclude that our greatest task is to overcome all of these obstacles.
Our true goal in life is to return to a different situation, one that has
succumbed to a dangerous escapism.
If the real is immediate and primordial then, by definition, it must
subsist in all creation. There is nothing in all creation that can separate
us from the intellectual love of God. Yet, interestingly enough, we live
separately from God. We live as interested and positioned subjects in a
world. How we relate to God, in this scenario, is imagined through a
form of transcendence that conceives God through the law; and this
only brings us closer to a form of sin. Deleuze’s solution, like his
spiritual allies, is to escape the world; we must get past the specific,
the (as-if), and become immediate to God (Hallward 1997b: 9). This
amounts to us being ‘remade’, as if our minds and our whole being
were transformed into a medium of God’s infinite creations. Hallward
sees Deleuze’s philosophy in the same light. Hallward draws an analogy
from Suhrawardi’s philosophy of illumination, which consists of thought
being aided by light and magic. In this model, light operates at a level of
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all reality and produces divine, metaphysical sources of knowledge. The
human is divided into two formal bodies: one tainted by the material
world and the other the soul, which is aided by the light, a light
that shelters these intellects in a collective oneness. Thus, it is thought
through the light that survives as the reviver and resuscitator of life. The
same is produced in Saint Paul, wherein the material world is in constant
flux of sin, and one must align oneself with the body of Christ in order
to escape the material world (10).
According to Hallward, Deleuze uses the term ‘the un-thought’ or
‘non-sense’ to describe the same otherworldly body. The multiple is an
expression of the one that is determined by its relation to God (Hallward
1997b: 10). All creatures aim to return to the movement towards the
light. Like Suhrawardi, we must move towards the one that springs in
all forms of life. Hallward feels that Deleuze’s notion of freedom in its
purest state is a form of obedience. The greater the right, of the one or
sovereign, the more perfect unity there will be to establish one united
body or substance (13).
These aforementioned points, Hallward states, direct us to the
elements of Deleuze’s real philosophy, which is an exclusive ontology
of univocity. Hallward claims that Deleuze does not offer us a critique
of representation: ‘What he gives us, at best, is a . . . “critique of
misrepresentation”’ (Hallward 1997a: 534). All of the following shows
how Deleuze repeatedly breaks out of all given situations in order to
jump into an ultimate monism. This is what Hallward states is the
absolute ‘monarch’ or sovereignty (13). According to Hallward, Deleuze
wants us to give up our worldly existence for a theophany. We have no
sense of the real nature of things; they have been blocked and concealed
from us by our deep-rooted human disposition. What Hallward sees
continuously in Deleuze is this redemptive move to save the creature.
III. Actual Creatures, Virtual Creatings, Confinement
and Escapism
Hallward states that Deleuze’s philosophy is centred on the idea that
being is creation. Creation embraces all features of reality and is the
pivotal centre of all of Deleuze’s works. If being is creation, being is
also essentially differential (Hallward 2006: 24). This process of being
differential is precisely what it means to be creative. Since being is part of
the absolute creativity in all there is, it must be able to differentiate itself
in an infinite amount of ways. This means that the most basic element
of being consists, in part, in the process of creating (24).
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Creating, in essence, serves as the reason behind all states of affairs,
individuals and events. This makes ‘being’ the ultimate form behind a
chaotic proliferation of unlimited events and creating that become one
with creation and nature (Hallward 2006: 27). Every distinct creation
creates a new organism, personality, object or experience. According
to Hallward, we can describe creation as one act but it proceeds as
two unique movements, through creations and creatures. Hallward
states that ‘Creare is one, we might say it involves both the active
creans and the passive creaturum. The creating is implied or implicated
within its creator; the creature is an explication or unfolding of the
creating’ (Hallward 2006: 27). As Hallward explains, Deleuze’s logic of
creation applies to each case of creating and creation. Deleuze attempts,
through the production of creation, to construct the real in and of itself
(Hallward 1997b: 16).
Differentiated creatures are a part of actual extended forms of being.
Yet, their existence is contingent, based upon the material constraints of
the world (bodies, organs, situations). These differentiated creations are
virtual and intensive rather than extended. Creation retains a primordial,
self-differing essence and this self-differing essence can only be conceived
in terms of a virtuality which actualises itself. Hallward’s main point
is that the real creative force between these two facets is only the
virtual creating. The creating does not occupy an external position to
the creature, but relies on the immanent relation internal to creation
and creating (Hallward 2006: 27). This immanent relation between
creature and creating arises internally through the creating to the
creature. Hallward insists on showing us the relation between creating
and creation. There is only one form of ‘active’ being that is truly alive,
and that stems from the virtual creating. It is only the virtual creating
that can differ and produce the new and the novel.
According to Hallward, no matter how much effort is put into
creating a work of art, a scientific function or a philosophical concept,
the only thing that matters is the process of creating. Thus, Deleuzian
philosophy privileges verbs over nouns to create, to act, to build
(Hallward 2006: 43). Therefore, this creating is more pure than an actual
living person, place or thing. A creating is not just a novel concept; it is
entirely new in itself and eternal. What makes creating new is precisely
this immanent and internal spark that creates and manifests change and
transformation. In reality, the actual creature is only a simulation of its
‘real’ identity. The material self is only an optical illusion or effect of
what is produced. It is only the virtual-creating that can produce the
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‘new’ or novel. The real essence of a creature is its de-actualised state or
the moment of its virtual-creativity (36).
Creation only exists through the form of creatures, and only creatures
can think the necessary process in which they are actualised. However,
the reality of the situation is quite different. The actualisation and
individuation of the actual person is always-only the essential product
of a production that is itself necessary and primary to the creature.
According to Hallward, the real destiny of the actual creature is to
create and invent new ways of dealing with its own material reality.
This inventive apparatus of dealing with materiality is precisely the
moment where the creature empties everything that constitutes the self,
thus dissolving it (Hallward 2006: 38).
As stated earlier, creation is a solitary action but proceeds through
an inherent dualism – the creating/creature and virtual/actual – and all
transformation occurs internally, in the expression which intensifies
it in an immanent monism. Essentially, all singular creations exist as
multiple entities in one united body. Creating retains a virtual and
ideal self-sufficiency that can only be deemed creative if, and only if,
it can be incarnated in an existent creature, which then expresses and
inhibits its own actualisation. According to Hallward, ‘The existence
(and resistance) of the creature is itself an internal necessity of creation;
and creatural opacity is an immanent and unavoidable obstacle to the
expression or development of being itself’ (Hallward 2006: 39). The
obstacle to which Hallward refers is the constraint of the material
world (our bodies, organisation of organs and our habits). Deleuze’s
philosophy is constantly at odds with the material world. According to
Hallward, Deleuze’s real work is devoted to creating concepts to loosen
the grip of conditions on the creature.
It is important to note that Deleuze dedicated two books to
Spinoza; and Hallward thinks there is a specific reason for this:
Deleuze’s philosophy occupies the Spinozist worldview, with some subtle
modifications. For example, there is no distinction of the virtual and
actual in Spinoza, but Hallward points out key similarities in both
thinkers’ metaphysics. ‘The term “naturans” implies an active, creative
feature, while “naturata” implies a passive, created substance’ (Hallward
2006: 57). We have seen that only the ‘virtual’ is active while the ‘actual’
creature is passive. Spinoza, like Deleuze, seeks to construe nature as
a self-creating reality. Every individual is precisely an active modifying
facet of this univocal substance. Each singular creating in this model
maintains the divine, eternal spark from the nature of God (57).
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To understand this process of a singular creating contained in
God/substance is to comprehend how all modifications are a part of
the means of expressing the divine essence. Actual creatures are not
‘modes’ contained in God, but can only refer to certain times and places,
which relate to themselves based on their own representation (Hallward
2006: 58). These actual creatures are clearly not active creations but
passive selves. They cannot be a part of the means for creating,
because they cannot express the one univocal power, they are stuck
and caught in their material and disinterested lives (50). What exactly
does this mean? Individuated/differentiated/actual creatures suffer from
‘inadequate ideas’, which are precisely the aforementioned affects. They
live material and interested lives. This implies that they cannot take
part in nature’s divine essence. Materiality implies worldly bondage,
limited to temporary existence. For Hallward’s Deleuze, virtual creating
is the only way that the production of the new can occur. It is only
through this type of production that this novel creation has eternal
existence that expresses the entirety of this infinite substance, and
it is only the virtual-creating that is expressive of the cosmos, or
God (57).
Henri Bergson, according to Hallward, devoted his entire work to the
nature of the virtual. For Bergson and Deleuze, the actual represents
the passive subject; its habits, needs and wants. Yet, at the core of
this subject, the actual represents the present. The misrepresentation of
reality, here, is that although the actual may seem quite solid to us, in
reality it is blurred by a materiality that falsely shapes the creature. The
virtual is reduced to memory, and it represents the past that fills in the
present. According to Hallward, the actual/creature is always guided by
an illusion of its real self. The virtual is both immaterial and not-present,
but it is seemingly the only real, lasting dimension of reality. It is the only
real creative apparatus, while the actual is stuck to a limited perspective
of the organism (Hallward 2006: 41).
If the actual represents an organised body, the virtual represents an
inorganic body that is disorganised and stripped of its material reality.
The virtual is aligned with memory and it has no action, sensation or
extension. Memory represents a pure form of immediacy and intuition.
Thus, memory is disinterested in all present action. It catapults us
towards the middle of a pure past or pure recollection. The pure past
need not strive to preserve itself; it remains whole within itself. When we
reflect on the past, we are not actualising or representing a memory to
ourselves. What is occurring is a moment where we are actually delving
deep into the past (Hallward 2006: 43).
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Hallward insists on this repeatedly: Deleuze strives for a privileged
position that produces its own de-actualisation and de-materialisation to
empty the subject (Hallward 2006: 81). The empty subject evacuates the
known creature in order to create. This model can only be maintained
correctly, in its momentum, as a theophany. Pure memory is powerless
and intensive. It shares no feelings or sensations and it contains no
self-interest for the creature. Although the actual/virtual cannot be
considered separately, the real task of every creature is to counter-
actualise and reverse its own creatural state confining it to a de-
materialised form (43).
Actualisation belongs to the virtual and the actualisation of a virtual
singularity is constituted by the plane of immanence. This plane is where
the creature is properly dissolved and annihilated. The virtual is the
subject of actualisation and the plane of immanence is nothing but a
process which converts objects into subjects. The ‘actual’ denotes an
existing human being who can think, feel, have sensations and qualities,
and embody a life story. The virtual describes characteristics that
are not presentable – virtual/creatings are never present or presentable.
Hallward’s example of this is taken from Deleuze’s last work Pure
Immanence: An Essay on a Life, in which Deleuze invokes Charles
Dickens’s character, Riderhood, who has a near-death experience.
Hallward states that:
The virtual life that lives in Riderhood, remember, is not the actual ‘subject
who incarnated it in the midst of things [and] who made it good or bad’;
it is rather the anonymous spark of life within him, with whom everyone
empathises in a sort of immediate intuition or sympathy. Such living is our
only genuine subject, . . . to be equal to the events that befall it, i.e. to the
creatings that transform it. (Hallward 2006: 36, quoting Deleuze 2001: 28)
Virtual differentiation creates what it actualises and this is because what
it really ‘actualises’ never resembles the singularities that it brings to life
(Hallward 2006: 37).
A creation is a kind of pre-existence that ignores all activity and is
the resemblance of real life. As Hallward notes, ‘the actual is always
constituted, while the virtual is wholly constituent’ (Hallward 2006: 37).
This is key to understanding Deleuze’s philosophy. The virtual is always
creative and the actual is always created (37). Virtual-creating is a pure
form of creativity in and of itself. It can be seen as a pure primordial
energy, which is both the constituent force of its power to create, along
with its inexhaustible need for transformation and change (37). The
Virtual can only be thought of as a kind of unthinkable abstraction. The
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force of transformation that is possessed within it is none other than
a pure intensity that aids both difference/being and the virtual creating
that incarnates all things.
As stated earlier, the actual is no more than an illusion or ephemeral
result of our true immaterial self. The virtual is ‘the real’ and exists
more actually then our material form; and this is predicated on the
fact that virtual-creations are fully intensive, while the actual is material
and extended. In a manner of speaking, the virtual-creating is intensive,
immaterial, unlimited and is always individuating pure forces. The actual
is material, extensive, limited and individuated; it is always in a fixed
state (Hallward 2006: 42).
Virtual creations can be conceived as events linked to quasi-causes.
Interestingly enough, Hallward states that an event to Deleuze is free
of all normative and personal causality. This means that all events
are virtual and, as incorporeal entities, they distance themselves from
actual corporeal entities. Creation and events are the same. An event
is actualised in a body. However, it also consists of a shadowy, secret
form that is eventually subtracted and then added to actualisation. The
virtual can be real without being ‘actual’. An event exists as a kind
of dead time, where what lies at the heart of it is a non-presentable,
immaterial, unmoving essence or spark. Such events exist as empty
floating entities or ‘mean-whiles’ where nothing ever takes place. This
means that the virtual-event can only be grasped by escaping our
subjective perspective. This involves a kind of suspension and dissolution
of all actual activity. Hallward recalls Deleuze’s example of a battle in
which the real event hovers over the battlefield and can only be realised
in its pure imperceptible state (Hallward 2006: 42). An event that occurs
cannot be part of our world; it must be out of this world. All identity
disappears from the self and the world in these virtual events. What
replaces ‘real’ material life is a power to intuit this impersonal reality,
which is presented to us, as a new world, beyond the given. This given
is material life in flux. However, we must somehow block this flux in its
movement and align with the singular (44).
All creatures that are able to create and to think must find the
necessary means to escape the world, in order that they continue to be
creative and thoughtful. Philosophy is obliged to lead us from actual
to virtual; or from our world it must then lead us ‘out of this world’
(Hallward 2006: 44). The goal of this philosophy is not just to leap out
of the world into another realm. Since, as actualised material beings,
we are alienated and confined to a false identity of ourselves, our escape
entails our de-actualisation or ‘deterritorialisation’, which brings us back
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to the point of virtual-creating previously discussed. This virtual-creating
is an impersonal and immaterial existence.
The ‘real’ layers of our human form, such as needs, wants, desire
and habits, are part of stratification. To stratify means building
material layers that form our representation of this world. According
to Hallward, Deleuze asks us to de-stratify ourselves, and to remove
the layers of humanity, dismantle the actual creature and destroy
the ‘organised organism’ (Hallward 1997a: 534). We must become a
‘body-without-organs’ and a ‘body-without-others’. Our material body
must attain a state where it can remove and de-populate itself from
the world. For Robinson Crusoe (deserted on an island), the creative
aspect of his existence is the moment where he no longer functions as
a human, but as the virtual spark of the island that connects all life
to one immanent life (Hallward 2006: 23). Our creatural confinement
has to do with our actual existence and our material presence. These
obstacles are imposed on the creature by our material constraints. Our
task, as creators, is to loosen the grip of the material world and let out
the virtual-creating that has been imprisoned inside of us. A creative
body is never an actual entity, but is a wholly virtual one. Like Robinson
Crusoe, we must learn to annihilate ourselves in order to let the ‘event-
island’ live thorough us (23).
IV. In Defence of Deleuze’s Logic of Creation:
Univocity and Equality
For Deleuze, the idea of becoming-subject involves a rupture. We
must fundamentally break the ties that bind a subject to all formal
representation. A subject and an apple can only individuate themselves
based on an internal form of difference, an expressive, dynamic form.
In order to ground difference in an expressive and dynamic form of
comprehension, Deleuze needs to disclose a form of difference that is
not created through the mediation of representation but understood
through an absolute immediacy, a pure contemplation. This form of
immediacy or pure contemplation is misrepresented by Hallward. The
fallacy of Hallward’s critique of Deleuze lies in the fact that we are
presented with a Deleuze who embraces all forms of representation,
who grounds difference on the negative and who takes advantage of
the notion of life. Hallward’s critique presents us with man as the centre
of all life and our mission as being to become anonymous, imperceptible
and de-materialise. If man is to become the centre of all life then why
would Deleuze demand the destruction of the subject? The destruction
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of the subject would then signal the removal of man from the world.
These two claims do not coincide. Hallward’s is far from the picture
that Deleuze paints of life. According to Deleuze, difference can only
be understood as difference once it can ‘differentiate’ what pertains to
it (Deleuze 1994: 172). What is needed for this process is a singular
individuating difference. This may sound peculiar, but what Deleuze has
in mind is an entirely differential ontology that invokes the creation of a
subject outside of our sensory-motor schema. He aims to present us with
subjects who can formally oppose this representational schema on a new
ground, that of repetition. What does this mean? In order to prevent us
from falling into Hallward’s trap of an ‘a-subjective’, ‘a-specific’ being,
we need to recognise how Deleuze uses Duns Scotus’ model of univocity.
Since difference cannot be understood through negation and opposition,
this newly created ‘difference-in-itself’ has no formal predicates standing
behind it. The shadow of difference will only be repetition, which is the
production of the new; the production of new difference. In essence,
this means that difference must be its own ‘differentiator of difference’,
or what Deleuze calls ‘a dark precursor’ that is always in-between the
forces of life, pulling them together and creating unities (119).
It is easy to get caught up in a thinker’s jargon, and most of
the problems that stem from accounts of Deleuze are the result of
misrepresenting these subtle processes. Hallward, for example, creates
the notions of creator, creating and creation in order to understand all
the alterations of difference. Yet, by doing this, he often misses steps and
blurs the distinctions between fundamental aspects of the philosophy.
For now, what we need to do is familiarise ourselves with univocity and
Scotus’ model of being. The principle of univocity holds that all being
is singular and that all entities are unique and resonate the same being
within all of reality. Deleuze states, ‘Being is univocal and it only has one
single voice’ (Deleuze 1994: 35).
This singular ontology does not mean that all objects and entities
are thrown into the same melting pot. Once being is understood as
singular, and this univocal principle is actualised, it posits a radical
thesis: all individuals, objects and entities should be comprehended as
pure intensities. Deleuze sees pure difference as a formal intensity that
lies behind difference. When we as individuals are actualised in activities,
this intensive stream of individuality is turned into an extensive force.
We can call this intensity ‘a pre-personal’ form of difference. It takes the
shape of a potential which is then actualised and individuated. This form
of individuation takes a pure potential and turns it into an extensive
reality. This means there are two forms of pure difference: one is a virtual
Deleuze and the Logic of Creation 37
structure behind an entity and the pre-personal. This is what Deleuze
calls differentiation, and it deals with intensity and the intensive (Deleuze
1994: 207). The other form of pure difference is known as the actual.
It is the individuation of being. What is important to note is that this
notion of intensity lies behind the relationship of both difference and
repetition, a difference that creates the new and the extensive.
Both of these forms of difference are based on a univocal model.
Deleuze states that ‘univocal being is at one and the same time a
nomadic distribution of crowned anarchy’ (Deleuze 1994: 36). It is easy
to misinterpret Deleuze’s conception of crowned anarchy. Essentially,
it should be understood as a set of multiples being expressive of this
singular difference that makes up all of reality. Deleuze posits the
theorem of monism = pluralism; what he has in mind is a theory of
monism that stresses more importance on a pluralism. Each and every
individual is essentially made up of this one totality. Each individual
is expressive of this whole. Deleuze sees this monism in a different
light than the history of monism in philosophy. What he ideally
formulates is a monism with a unique variation of the multiple, each
multiple possessing its own fundamental perspective of the whole. This
is precisely why difference must produce the intensive. We must first
be acquainted with life in order to be able to express it. Intensity is
understood as a depth of the world, which opens a new space around
us, that once actualised can be extensive or extended to be part of this
whole. Hallward does not see the model in this way. He presumes that
this crowned anarchy must be viewed like Thomas Hobbes’s political
model of a Leviathan standing over all beings. Since the state of nature
is dangerous, it is the Leviathan, a giant, that keeps everyone in their
place working towards society.
This model makes all individuals fall prey to the rules and regulations
of the one, but this one is a determinate totality, meaning everything
is fixed in place. In Hallward’s interpretation of Deleuze, his monism
is a prison for actual creatures. Their mission is to de-actualise and
become part of this Leviathan. Notice here, it is the Leviathan that
gives us a reality. It is what centres our ‘representation’ of the world.
Thus, Hallward’s comparison of the Leviathan and its sovereign reign
does not align with the Deleuzian singular and its perspective-based
monism. Hallward is still presenting Deleuze’s philosophy in the realm
of opposition, analogy and negation.
These errors of representation form what Deleuze calls the ‘black
nothingness of difference’ (Deleuze 1994: 28). Deleuze differentiates
between the colours black and white to express the difference between
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intensity and representation. The colour black denotes the absence of all
colours. All we have to do is think of the concept of a black hole which
swallows all forms of light. If we cannot think of these colours outside
of the black background as being individual intensities or individual
differences, than all of them would melt into this black nothingness.
What representation, analogy, negation and opposition present us with
is a model of the same and the similar. Once we have melted into the
same blackness, we are no longer individuated, actualised and grounded
on our own unique perspective. All is lost in this ubiquitous self-same
law of how things are supposed to appear to us.
This is the negation of difference and the individual. This is how
Hallward’s argument depicts Deleuze: Deleuze, for Hallward, wants
to melt everything into the same substance. In this melting of all
things there is no room for difference because difference is negated.
Hallward’s position misrepresents Deleuze, and depicts an internal
form of representation. This creates the space to move difference, the
singular and the individual into nothingness. This destroys the model
of uniqueness, expression and individuality. It reduces all particulars to
the same. It also depicts our current societal state. We have a society of
unique differences that are moulded according to how the ‘one’ imposes
its structure. Either all individuality is reduced to the same in order
to make each of these individuals a profitable outlet that gives back
to the system; or they are not conducive to the system as a whole
and their differences are not welcomed. The whole is fragmented on
the schism of how the multiple should relate to the one. This forced
conception blurs the distinction between who produces and who is
seen as ‘wholly other’, creating and fragmenting a system of others
that are never visible in the societal whole. Yet, Deleuze’s univocal
model is better described as an ‘undifferentiated white abyss’ (Deleuze
1994: 28). In this model, Deleuze makes room for every differential
equation. If we look at the colour white as the elemental that exists
in all colours, its dynamic spark or expressive intensity is contained
in all visible reality. All colours possess a degree of whiteness in their
constitution. The fundamental element of difference is what links the
multiple with the whole. However, we are taught through the history of
philosophy that to differentiate between two things we must not base
this knowledge on a creative intensity that everyone possesses. Rather,
we are taught to exclude and see reality through the eyes of opposition
and negation. The method of equal intensity is how we are to understand
univocity; the process of differentiation is what preserves all ‘individual’
being.
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Crowned anarchy is, therefore, not a sovereign, medieval deity, which
stands guard over us and makes us obey the rigid laws of the one. This
result fragments difference. Crowned anarchy is like a giant white wall.
Now, this white wall is entirely made up of several degrees of intensity
that form the concept of white. Yet, there are unique variations and
degrees of white that make up the wall. It is this multiple variation of
intensity that differentiates between other degrees and forms a cohesive
and singular reality. Notice here that each variation of white makes up
the one. Each variation has its own unique perspective of the whole.
The black nothingness isolates and cuts all the degrees of intensity, and
severs difference and the subject. It melts them into the absorption of
the one. These multiple perspectives of the one make reality; they add
to it, they are part of the dynamic flow and flux of life. When life is
severed from its activity, it is no longer active, but a passive subject
that is melted into the framework of a false reality. We no longer
believe in the world because we are cut off from its relations. The
world in which we do believe again is this world built upon a univocal
framework. This ‘undifferentiated-difference’ is the white abyss, where
each subject is seen as an ‘equal quality’ of its infinite expression. This
white wall has an infinite amount of attributes and an infinite amount
of degrees; each individual reverberates and allows multiple sensations
that can grasp all of reality. What univocity can offer us is a fundamental
model of difference that is unaffected by representation. The real method
behind the univocity of being and the differentiation of difference is to
show how singular difference can differentiate among differential entities
‘only’ when all objects, subjects, animals and entities are seen as an equal
part of reality. This essential equality allows the space for all beings to
express of themselves in all of ‘life’.
Deleuze’s differential ontology is first and foremost ‘a philosophy of
life’. This is the real method behind Deleuze. Hallward is right that
Deleuze devoted two texts to Spinoza. However, Deleuze’s fundamental
pursuit, in his Spinozist analysis, is the hidden element of reality, the
hidden element behind difference, ‘intensity’ and how this intensive-
difference could become dynamic and expressive. Deleuze’s texts on
Spinoza are not about a God who can redeem us from the poison of
the world, nor is there any logic of salvation built into this framework.
It is the concept of ‘expression’ that Deleuze devotes these two books to.
How can we become expressive again? How can we believe in a world
that we ourselves cannot express? And so the leading statement of the
text is the following: ‘We still do not know what a body can do’ (Deleuze
1990b: 2010). The real question behind these texts is how can a body
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become an adequate expression of itself and all reality (210)? The real
thinker that Deleuze models his metaphysics after is Leibniz. He devoted
an entire text to Leibniz’s conception of how reality is built by layers,
or folds. Each layer or fold is like a line, a reality built upon a never-
ending series of lines. Each one of these lines or layers forms the identity
or perspective of each unique differential being (Deleuze 1993: 8).
When a line of intensity converges or is forced to converge on any
kind of representational assemblage, this singular line deteriorates and
is blocked from expressing its unique perspective on the whole. This
process is what Deleuze calls ‘reterritorialisation’. If a line can diverge
away from the series, if it is allowed to fold and enfold, creating a new
series amongst the whole, this process is called ‘deterritorialisation’. This
is the real process behind life; to create new assemblages and form new
series of differential beings. Life must create expressive outlets for these
continued processes of divergence. This divergence is called a ‘line of
flight’, and once it frees itself from the convergence of the series, a new
difference is produced through the repetition that embodies the series.
This is the continued cycle we live in. Difference is first thrown into the
face of a converging series, wherein it is blocked, cut off and reduced
to representational ambiguities. Or, it can produce differential-being by
diverging from the series, thus repeating the expressive-dynamic flow of
life. Difference and repetition are the basis of reality.
This is the model of being that Deleuze imports from Leibniz. We do
not need to go too in-depth into Leibniz’s theory, but it is important
that we see the close connection between Leibniz’s monad and Deleuze
differential-singular being. According to Leibniz, a monad is a simple
substance that is encased in ‘the one’ of reality or the universe (Deleuze
1993: 26). If we return to the example of the white wall, each monad,
like the degrees of intensity that constitute it, forms all of reality. Each of
these simple substances differentiates itself in the whole by dynamically
adding in its own perspective. When a line diverges from the series, the
repetition of its movement and its divergence creates ‘a new difference’,
an ‘extensive difference’. Subsequently, this extensive difference is what
adds its perspective on the whole. A newly created perspective, ‘singular-
differential extensive’, creates the dynamic whole: a pluralism that makes
up a monism.
Where representation demands recognition, univocity implies an
inherent equality that is the basis of all human reality. All living
beings are ‘a part’ of this organic one-all. Each monad, as a subject,
animal and plant, is conceived of as a differend (Deleuze 1994: 230).
Each monad must actively animate itself from passive difference to
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active difference, from representation to univocal singularity, from
intensive to extensive, the move from the convergent series to a
divergent actuality. Hallward completely misrepresents Deleuze. Instead
of portraying an immediate ‘white undifferentiated intensive’ that is
affected and expressive of an ‘immanent’ reality, he presents Deleuze
bound to forms of representation, melted into the black nothingness.
The underlying message of this black nothingness to Hallward is
categorised by a God who demands that his subjects become non-
living entities and transcend every human assemblage. Once a univocal
conception of difference is actualised and divergent deterritorialisation is
affirmed:
The body is no longer the obstacle that separates us from thought itself. But it
is the movement that we overcome, a false sense of thinking that we shatter,
once this is realized, we are plunged into the depths of reaching the unthought
that is life, not that the body thinks but now it is free from the obstinate and
stubborn world of identity, it is difference which forces us to think what is
concealed from thought and reality. (Deleuze 1989: 189)
The above quote shows what life is for Deleuze, a life without
categories and a body-without-hierarchies. Hallward confuses this
conception of the singular. He misunderstands that all life is creation, for
Deleuze, and the novel and the new are a part of the dynamic between
the convergent and divergent series.
V. The Active Subject and the Three Syntheses of the Singular
We know that Deleuze characterises the subject by a singular difference
and that at the very base of the subject is a form of intensity.
Nevertheless, this is still a difficult concept to grasp. According to
Deleuze, the subject is part of a tripartite dialectic. Now, Deleuze never
uses the word ‘dialectic’. We are going to invoke this terminology
because these three syntheses of the subject are asymmetrical, meaning
they are always occurring at each moment. Each multidimensional layer
involved in this synthesis is interacting with several stimuli and being
affected and reproducing a new effect. This dialectic is staged between
the past, the present and the future.
The Humean subject is an empty screen. Like a movie theatre, it is
empty until a projector passively shines images upon it. This passive
screen lets in these sense impressions, forming a bundle of experiences.
This sensuous bundle is what Deleuze defines as a habitual experience
of sense data that affect us in our daily lives, forming our day-to-
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day moments. These moments of habit, or contracting a habit, is
what Deleuze calls the process of ‘habitus’ and this denotes all present
experience. Habit becomes the constitutive root of the passive subject
but in order for this present to pass or be filled in with context,
the past must be able to actively integrate and substitute a complete
consciousness.
Deleuze invokes the Bergsonian ‘pure past’ as that which conditions
the present, for the present could be nothing without a past that has not
passed (Deleuze 1990a: 61). The pure past is a transcendental feature for
Deleuze and it is this transcendental feature that gives content and depth
to the passive subject. Interestingly enough, this form of pure past is
what Hallward describes as empty and what causes friction between the
material and the immaterial. However, what Hallward does not grasp
is that this pure past is not in some immaterial realm. Time grounds
the subject. Time is also the feature that aids repetition and meaning.
Time is part of the virtual structure that pushes the convergent series
into a divergent series. Deleuze calls this ‘recollection-subjectivity and
contraction-subjectivity’ (53). The present will always be part of the
actual subject, but an actual subject without intensity and extensity is
nothing other than an empty shell. Yet, something is still required of
the subject and there is a missing step. If Deleuze is trying to map
out the free-flowing line of flight from passive to active subject, then
what is it that animates these polar identities? What is it that connects
the potential with the actual? This problem has caused many rifts in
Deleuzian thought. What we need to remember is that Deleuze is not
‘emptying’ out the subject in order to bring forward some dynamic
immaterial force. What activates these two forces is the most ambiguous
and problematic feature in all of Deleuze’s philosophy. This feature is
the death of the subject. What we have to keep in mind is that, for
Deleuze, thought really maps onto the body and each decade of thought
changes the milieu of peoples. We have seen the Humean paradigm and
the Bergsonian, but to truly understand the death of the subject we have
to jump backwards into the Kantian paradigm. We should keep in mind
that death for Deleuze is not how we perceive death today. It is not
the end or the destruction of the subject. We need to establish some
background in the history of philosophy first before we can begin to
understand this idea of the death of the subject.
For Descartes, time is held in place by the divine and the mechanistic
world is created by God. The world works like clockwork and every
part of the body has its place and role. In answering the question of
subjectivity, Kant starts off with the same Cartesian problematic. Kant
Deleuze and the Logic of Creation 43
uses the ‘cogito’ as the sole condition that solidifies the subject. Kant
explains that this new cogito is a transcendental feature, meaning that it
helps the human organism conform to its awareness. This ‘I’ that helps
condition the subject is the main synthesis of all of our experience. It
is best described by Kant as the faculties. What we call ‘the self’ today
is part of the transcendental illusion, the illusion that we have a self.
Kant agrees with Hume that we are just passive subjects. Those faculties
that consist of the ‘I’ merely synthesise all of our experience, although
its function is not really part of the subject. Kant has two functions
of subjectivity: the ‘I’ and the ‘self’. However, the ‘self’ is aided by
reason to uphold this illusion, this thing-in-itself. This moment in Kant’s
philosophy between these two identities is what creates the schizophrenic
subject for Deleuze.
This rupture in all passive experience forms a fundamental dualism.
Deleuze affirms that this sequence in thought creates a global unrest in
the universal subject. The schizophrenic ‘I’ is never consolidated and
Hegel’s solution to this problem between the world of phenomena and
noumena is to create the dialectic of representation, which fragments
the subject even further. According to Deleuze, both Kant and Hegel
uphold this ironic gesture of death. In order to free our judgements from
being passive and empty, Kant creates the notion of practical reason,
which makes this illusion of self have the power to create judgements. In
addition, Hegel’s gesture is to formulate a negative ground to solve the
problem of this inherent lack.
Deleuze is willing to accept this moment between the schizophrenic
‘I’ and the illusion of the ‘self’, but only if another solution is able
to fix the problem. Practical reason in the form of judgements cannot
help condition the subject. Neither can the negative ground, if habits
fundamentally form the constituency of the subject and the past is our
access to filling in these experiences with depth. Deleuze is in the same
position as Kant and Hegel: something must be able to ground the
unconditioned conditions. In other words, Deleuze needs a fundamental
synthesis to conjoin this moment of schizophrenia. The Kantian route
is to make this empty subject believe in the illusion of the self and the
soul, by giving it judgements. However, judgements depend upon the
false kind of representation that forms convergent blockages. This form
of representation creates an indifferent-difference. The Hegelian path
leads to controlling the subject, by letting it be guided by the ground
of the negative. Since this ground does nothing but give the subject an
objective lack, Hegel’s answer is that transcendence must be posited
in order to align self-consciousness with a form of absolute knowing.
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The key to answering this solution, according to Deleuze, is that all
humans exist among these processes of Humean habits, Bergsonian time
and Kantian illusions. However, Deleuze’s solution is to dissolve these
representational habits and illusory judgements of self, difference must
peel back the layers of its passivity. This becoming-intensive is Deleuze’s
solution.
What Deleuze calls the ‘death drive’ is the moment of freeing
these forced representational sedimentations on the body. Judgements,
opposites and habits create hierarchies on the subject. Since we go
through this continual process between the ‘I’ and the self, Deleuze
states that Nietzsche’s eternal return will be our saving grace. Every
time we reach this point of tension between the schizophrenic ‘I’ and
the self, repetition creates the production of the new, a new difference,
the dissolving of the self. This brings us closer to what really makes the
subject, its real actions and real potential, a real new difference.
This stripped-down subject is the virtual-body: it is a body-without-
organs, a non-hierarchised, non-sexualised subject. What is left of the
subject is nothing but a series of active larval selves beneath our habits
and representations. These larval selves represent the pre-individual
singularities and activities that we possess. It is a dynamic self, and
a real configuration of difference, because we go through this process
constantly. When the cycle is repeated we go back to this state of
pre-individual activities. Our goal is to affirm our absolute intensive
actuality, we are more than just our habits, and this is why Deleuze
calls on Nietzsche’s idea of becoming and the eternal return.
These larval selves are pure affirmation. They create the multitude
that makes us an active being. What makes ‘you’ you is not your habits,
or the way the world is represented to you, but how you ‘actualise’
your dynamic power, your creative spark, and this is the solution to
the dualism between the ‘I’ and the self; beneath the crude materiality of
everything, there is another self, an ‘other-self’, a multiple of selves that
make up the unity of all of our activity. Deleuze claims that ‘Underneath
the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render
possible both action and the active subject’ (Deleuze 1994: 75). Action
is greater than judgements. Life outweighs illusion and simulacra. This
statement by Deleuze means that the ‘self’ is not based on its level of
passivity or a crisis of illusion. Rather, it is the essential and dynamic, the
intensive and the active self. When we act, and affirm all of the potential
living beneath us, this chance, this ‘roll of the dice’, hands us back over
to our lives (Deleuze 2006: 25).
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VI. Constructivism and the Actual and the Virtual
Partly what makes Peter Hallward’s critique so strong is the logic of
theophany that he invokes on Deleuze. Hallward states that Deleuze
partakes in a one-all logic. One cannot really deny this framework
but there are two points we must address: (1) the one-all does not
refer to a unifying totality but to the plane of all thought and
life, because Deleuze invokes a philosophy of constructivism and it
is centred on the logic of creation; (2) in order to pass off this
logic, Hallward makes a category mistake between immanence as the
plane of all thought and emanation, a medieval theological concept.
For Deleuze, concepts represent fundamental events and literally all
events, and concepts, are part of this pre-philosophical plane. Even
concepts go through the process of differentiation. Differentiation
represents a virtual structure for Deleuze; we must not understand
the virtual in terms of virtual reality, but as a moment of a structure
or pre-individual singularity awaiting actualisation. These presupposed
moments are called problems/structures. The problematic is an intensive
field of differentiation, meaning it consists of several pre-individual
singularities. Like our larval state, the pre-individual activities have not
been actualised and individuated. The real process is to actualise these
problematic structures and turn them into life solutions.
These potentialities have the necessary means to germinate into
life cycles. Deleuze’s philosophy maps out these ontogenetic and
morphogenetic processes. We must return to the world, return to life,
and thus, Deleuze’s philosophy is an ontology of life. Hallward is correct
that Deleuze has a vital philosophy but his one-all does not refer to a God
and his creatures, rather to multiple processes that involve these pre-
individual potentials in their virtual structure; their convergent state and
the movement to their actualisation into a real solution, ‘a real life’. The
actual signals the divergent series and the production of the new. These
virtual/actual multiples make up all of our reality and can be defined
as simple problems and solutions. They cannot be reduced to a deity,
for a deity is a representation of how the world works. If we look at
simple vegetal life, plants form a virtual structure with the earth, there
are pre-individual singularities that make up their constitution, and what
photosynthesis produces in plant life is the process of intensity, which
takes sunlight and turns it into simple sugars feeding the plant. The plant
then takes the nutrients and actualises them all over its body and then
returns what is left to the soil. This active genesis or ‘differenciation’ in
46 Christopher Satoor
the plant is what Deleuze calls becoming-intense (Deleuze and Guattari
1987: 197).
This differential ontology starts off with ‘differentiation’ (virtual
structure) and then moves to ‘differenciation’ (the genesis of actuality).
To Deleuze, this is life solving problems and creation and novelty
working at every second. So the structure of the virtual-actual is not
the fundamental dualism posited by Hallward, but is an asymmetrical
synthesis of life. Concepts are formed in the same manner, a problem is
posed in a pre-individual state and the concept is created out of thought
and actualised as a solution. Descartes created the cogito as a solution to
radical subjectivity, and in doing this he solved the problem of medieval
subjectivity.
Any time this dynamic logic of creation is used – virtual/actual,
convergent/divergent, differentiation/differenciation – the outcome is
always an ‘event’. An event is the individuation and actualisation of
differenciation (the incarnation of the actual); Deleuze’s point is that
we are always-already in a problem. Life is about these fundamental
encounters and solving each moment. It is not just the human organism
that encounters problem-solving; the forces of life work in this exact
way. This is something that Hallward is not able to accept. A
thunderstorm, states Deleuze, is a virtual structure, the tension in the
ground and the surge of electrical energy in the clouds create the process
of differentiation; this is the moment of pre-individual singularities that
create the potential that causes this influx of intensity. The actualisation
or genesis of the storm is the bolt of lightning; this is the process of
differenciation or the actual individuation of the storm. Life works
through ‘the logic of creation’, and our means of problem-solving are
created through concepts elaborated through philosophy, art, science
and politics. Hallward is not able to accept this kind of creation of
the new because he sees Deleuze’s philosophy based on a false ground
of immanence.
VII. Conclusion: ‘A Part’ of This World
In conclusion, Peter Hallward’s critique of Deleuze exploits the concept
of life. Deleuze’s philosophy is one that is based on ‘a logic of creation’,
a vital and dynamic expression of how we as subjects can ‘believe’
in the world again. The world, for Deleuze, is comparable to an egg.
It is an egg that always puts us into a problem and an ‘encounter’
with life. If the world is embryonic, it is because among its endless
possibilities are contained these pre-individual potentialities awaiting
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our indefinite actualisation. If we are always-already in a problem, it is
because we are always ‘in the world’, a world that is bound to the logic
of creation, where intensity and difference are united in all activities of
life. The production of the new, creation and novelty are occurring at
every second, from thunderstorms, to photosynthesis, to procreation.
Deleuze’s philosophy is a system that maps our becoming-germinal, and
this process is not in some other-worldly realm or held together by a
God. It is ‘we’ that determine the flux and flow of all of our actions.
Deleuze thinks that by changing the configuration of our understanding,
by getting rid of false hierarchies and representations, we can have
another chance at becoming a subject and becoming another self that
is ‘a part’ of a dynamic and expressive world.
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